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A REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL
MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT BY ITS MONITOR
JOSEPH A. SMITH, JR.*
Since April 2012, I have served as Monitor of the consent
judgments commonly known as the National Mortgage Settlement (the
“Settlement”). The obligations of the mortgage servicer parties to the
first five of such judgments1 were satisfied in March 2016. Three
consent judgments under the Settlement’s structure remain in effect.2
Although the mortgage servicing settlement process is ongoing,
completion of the first five consent judgments is an appropriate vantage
point from which to review the Settlement and assess its impact and
significance. This Article provides such a review and assessment based
on my work as the Settlement’s Monitor.
I. EVENTS PRECIPITATING THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT
The Settlement was one response to the 2008 financial crisis
(the “Financial Crisis”).3 While you can still get into a fairly heated

* Joseph A. Smith, Jr. is President of the Office of Mortgage Settlement Oversight, Inc., and
a Partner at Poyner Spruill, LLP.
1. United States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00361-RMC, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 188892, at *105–06 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012). While Bank of America is the mortgage
servicer named in the case, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Ally/GMAC,
and Wells Fargo were all subject to the consent judgment. See Consent Judgments, United
States v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00361-RMC (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012), ECF Nos. 10–
14, for the consent judgment filing for each of the respective parties. These consent
judgments are referred to in this article as the “National Mortgage Settlement” or the
“Settlement” or the “NMS.”
2. Consent Judgment, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 13-cv02025-RMC (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2014), ECF No. 12; Consent Judgment, United States v.
Suntrust Mortg., Inc., No. 14-cv-01028-RMC (D.D.C. Sep. 30, 2014), ECF No. 65; United
States v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., No.16-cv-00199-RJL, LEXIS 59487 (D.D.C. Mar.
14, 2016).
3. For an exhaustive description and discussion of the Financial Crisis, see, for
example, THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011), https://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcicreports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf.
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argument about the causes of the Financial Crisis,4 I think (perhaps
optimistically) that it can be agreed that misconduct and bad judgment
in residential mortgage lending was at its epicenter. During the run-up
to the Financial Crisis, the U.S. home ownership rate increased
significantly, based in part on lending to borrowers who turned out to be
unable to repay. The music stopped in 2007 and 2008 when the housing
bubble burst, resulting in damage to a number of major real estate
markets in the U.S. and financial markets globally. Foreclosures and
related bankruptcy filings increased dramatically as a result.
The experience of federal and state government agencies and the
courts in dealing with the foreclosure tsunami arising from the Financial
Crisis made it clear that the mortgage servicing systems of our largest
financial institutions, which had been set up on the assumption that a
1.5% default rate was a bad year,5 were overwhelmed by default rates
that were much higher than that. The efforts of banks and nondepository servicers to address these deficiencies in capacity were way
too little and way too late, and the impact on borrowers and the legal
process was severe.
“Robosigning,” a neologism referring to the signing of
foreclosure or bankruptcy documents by people with no knowledge of
the facts underlying such documents, was a popular catchphrase used to
describe the dislocation in mortgage servicing, but the industry’s
problem was far deeper and more serious than that. Filing of
incomplete, incorrect, and even false documents was all too common, as
were lost documents, dual tracking (proceeding with a foreclosure while
allegedly processing a loan modification), and abusive if not illegal
collection tactics. Worse in some ways was the
general
unresponsiveness by servicers to distressed borrowers seeking relief,
often leaving such borrowers in prolonged and frustrating uncertainty
about whether they were going to get relief or lose their homes.
Mishandling of distressed mortgage loans by major servicers not
only resulted in consumer complaints; it led to allegations of serious
violations of law. Because of the interrelationship of federal and state
See id. at viii (four of ten commissioners dissenting from the final report).
See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., CHARGE-OFF AND
DELINQUENCY RATES ON LOANS AND LEASES AT COMMERCIAL BANKS (last updated Nov. 18,
2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/delallsa.htm (showing average
default rates on residential mortgages as just above 1.5% in the five years preceding the
Financial Crisis).
4.
5.
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laws in the origination and sale of residential home mortgages, abuses
in the mortgage market violated both state and federal law. Each of the
consent judgments comprising the Settlement is based on allegations of
violations of, “among other laws, the Unfair and Deceptive Acts and
Practices law of the Plaintiff States, the False Claims Act, the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, the
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, and the Bankruptcy Code and Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.”6 Sorting these claims out in federal
and state courts would have involved the expenditure of many millions
of dollars and years of effort with little certainty of outcome. So the
parties settled.
II. THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT
The Settlement was made up of five consent judgments between
the United States Government and forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia, on the one hand (the “Government Parties”), and five major
financial institutions (Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Citi, Wells
Fargo and Ally) on the other (the “Servicers”). In exchange for a
release from liability for the claims mentioned above, the Servicers
agreed to three sets of obligations: (i) cash payments to governments
and foreclosed homeowners, (ii) soft-dollar relief to distressed and
underwater borrowers,7 and (iii) adoption of servicing standards or rules
of conduct to deal with distressed loans. The Settlement was an
agreement by the parties to forego full and final litigation of the claims
mentioned above in favor of a resolution that provided substantial and
immediate financial payments and relief to governments and consumers
in exchange for release of the Servicers from the claims with the largest
potential financial and reputational consequences.
The Settlement did not release the Servicers from all potential
liabilities arising from their residential mortgage activities. It did not,
for example, release them from potential liability for violation of federal
fair lending laws. Further, it did not cut off potential claims by

E.g., Bank of Am. Corp., LEXIS 188892, at *15.
“Distressed” borrowers were delinquent in their payments, generally more than 90
days past due; “underwater” borrowers were current on their mortgage payments but unable
to refinance their loans because the value of the mortgaged property was less than the
outstanding balance of the related mortgage loan.
6.
7.
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aggrieved individual borrowers who wished to pursue them, and it
explicitly prohibited the conditioning of relief on a waiver of rights
other than in settlement of pending litigation.8 Finally, it did not settle
potential criminal claims or claims for fraud in the origination and sale
of the mortgage backed securities.9 This last category of claims has
resulted in additional litigation brought both by government and private
parties, and has resulted in a number of significant and costly additional
settlements.10
The Settlement was and is the subject of much debate regarding
its wisdom, sufficiency, and effectiveness. It has been criticized with
varying degrees of subtlety from a variety of viewpoints for: (i) giving
inadequate or illusory relief to borrowers; (ii) being a soft extortion by
governments that does not meet the actual needs of borrowers; and (iii)
failing to hold “too big to fail” banks and their executives accountable
for causing the Financial Crisis. While I think much of the criticism
fails to adequately credit the Settlement’s achievements, discussed
below, it persists nonetheless, likely because of a perceived lack of
retribution—namely, jail time for bank executives.
III. ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT
In my view, the Settlement was a valuable and effective
resolution of outstanding claims by all of its parties for a number of
reasons, including:
•

Size and Scope. The Settlement addressed the
alleged misconduct of mortgage servicers that
accounted for over 50% of the market.11 The

8. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp., 188892, at *278–86 (setting out “Claims and Other
Actions Exempted from Release” by the state plaintiffs).
9. See, e.g., id. at *287–95 (setting out federal claims “specifically reserved and . . .
not released”).
10. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State Partners
Secure Record $13 Billion Global Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading Inv’rs About
Sec. Containing Toxic Mortgs. (Nov. 19, 2013) (announcing a $13 billion settlement
between the DOJ and JPMorgan “arising out of the packaging, marketing, sale and issuance
of residential mortgage-backed securities”); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Bank of Am. to
Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic Justice Dep’t Settlement for Fin. Fraud Leading up to and
During the Fin. Crisis (Aug. 21, 2014) (announcing a $16.65 billion settlement between the
DOJ and Bank of America for the same practices).
11. Larry Cordell, et al., Fed. Reserve Bd., The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers:
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relief it obtained from the banks included $5
billion in aggregate cash payments to
governments and foreclosed homeowners, which
exceeded by a multiple of two to three times, per
bank, anything any financial firm had paid in
prior settlements.12
•

Relief to Distressed Borrowers. The Settlement
required the granting of approximately $20
billion in “soft dollar” relief to distressed
borrowers, including debt modification or
forgiveness, refinancing of underwater loans,
and short sale or deed in lieu of foreclosure
assistance. This requirement ultimately led to
over $50 billion in gross dollar relief to more
than 640,000 families around the country.13
This relief came at a time when millions of
borrowers needed it and when the parties would
have otherwise been in litigation.

Myths and Realities 14 (2008) (showing “Large Servicer Holdings of High-Risk
Mortgages” at year-end 2007).
12. Prior to the Financial Crisis, the largest financial institution settlement was the
2003 settlement obligating ten Wall Street firms to pay a total of $1.4 billion for various
conflicts of interest. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms
Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and
Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003) (announcing penalties for implicated firms ranging
from $32.5 million to $400 million). The Settlement’s $5 billion cash payment required
JPMorgan, Bank of America, Citigroup, Ally/GMAC, and Wells Fargo to pay $1.08 billion,
$3.24 billion, $415 million, $110 million, and $1.01 billion, respectively. Summary of
National Mortgage Settlement, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 11 (Mar. 12, 2012), http://
www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/Summaryof-AG-Settlement-3-12-12.pdf. At the time it was reached, the Settlement was the second
largest ever obtained by U.S. attorneys general, the largest being the $206 billion 1998
Master Tobacco Settlement. Because the disparity between the settlements in the total
dollar amount is undoubtedly great, the overall breadth of the NMS may be better reflected
by its similarities to the Master Tobacco Settlement in its imposition of sweeping
institutional reform. For more on the Master Tobacco Settlement, see TOBACCO CONTROL
LEGAL CONSORTIUM, THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: AN OVERVIEW (2015), http://
publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/tclc-fs-msa-overview-2015.pdf.
13. OFFICE OF MORTG. SETTLEMENT OVERSIGHT, ORIGINAL SERVICERS’ FINAL
COMPLIANCE UPDATE 13 (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/wpcontent/uploads/sites/4/2016/02/Original-Servicers-Final-Compliance-Update2.29.2016.pdf.
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•

Establishing Servicing Standards.
The
Settlement also required the banks to comply
with over 300 servicing standards, or rules of
conduct, in their handling of distressed home
loans.14 These rules went into effect at a time
when the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”) was just organizing itself and before
Richard Cordray had been confirmed as
Director. The CFPB ultimately issued final
servicing rules (similar to but not the same as the
NMS servicing standards), which are now in
effect.15 The Settlement’s rules governed a
substantial portion of the market before the
CFPB rules were issued and when the finality of
such rules was in doubt.16

•

Cooperation Among Governments and Across
Party Lines. As noted above, the Federal
Government, forty-nine States and the District of
Columbia were parties to the Settlement. Each
of the consent judgments contained an
agreement between the governments not only on
settlement terms, but also a cooperative
governance structure.17 The Settlement was the

14. See, e.g., United States, v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-cv-00361-RMC, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 188892, at *181–215 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2012). Spreadsheet view available at
https://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2014/05/ServicingStandards-Spreadsheet-1.xlsx.
15. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.30–41
(2016).
16. Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 10696, 10701-02 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
pt. 1024) (discussing the regulatory framework for mortgage servicing prior to the CFPB
and Regulation X). Additionally, on October 11, 2016, the District of Columbia Circuit
ruled that the CFPB was unconstitutionally structured, in violation of Article II of the
Constitution, but held that it would strike down only the provision of Dodd-Frank Act
limiting the President to removing the single director of CFPB for cause in order to remedy
constitutional violation. PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 839 F.3d 1, 8–9 (D.C.
Cir. 2016). On February 16, 2017, the D.C. Circuit granted the CFPB’s petition for
rehearing en banc, scheduling PHH’s brief to be due March 10th and the CFPB’s brief to be
due March 21st, with oral arguments to be heard on May 24, 2017. Petition for Rehearing
En Banc Granted, PHH Corp., 839 F.3d 1 (No. 15-1177).
17. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Corp., LEXIS 188892, at *181 (establishing “[a] committee

2017]

THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT

35

first major post-Dodd-Frank enforcement action
in this regard, in contrast to the pre-Dodd-Frank
world where State-Federal jurisdictional conflict
was common.18 It is also at least interesting to
note that of the forty-nine State Attorneys
General who signed on, twenty-five were
Democrats and twenty-four were Republicans.
•

Enforcement Through Supervisory Means. In
order to ease compliance concerns, the
Settlement set up a “Monitor” to oversee the
banks’ performance.19 The employment of a
monitor has become increasingly common in
financial and other settlements. The NMS is
somewhat unique in that it established a detailed
supervisory approach to oversight—visitation
and measurement by testing—under which the
Monitor was to function. As Monitor, I hired a
small army of professionals through whom I
confirmed that the banks had: (i) granted all of
the “consumer relief” to distressed borrowers
required by the Settlement and (ii) complied
with the Settlement’s servicing standards. This
confirmation was not a formal audit; rather, it
was validation of the bank’s own assessment
through agreed statistical sampling of their

comprising representatives of the state Attorneys General, State Financial Regulators, the
U.S. Department of Justice, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development”
to facilitate enforcement of settlement terms).
18. Compare Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 12 (2007) (holding that
National Bank Act did not preempt state registration and inspection requirements for a
federally chartered bank and its state-chartered mortgage subsidiary), and Cuomo v.
Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 529 (2009) (holding that the Comptroller’s regulation
purporting to preempt state law enforcement was not a reasonable interpretation of the
National Bank Act) with Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. at 10706 (“The Bureau has considered each of
these comments relating to the cumulative impact of mortgage regulation, including the
mortgage servicing rules; the potential for inconsistent results with current servicing
obligations, including State law and the National Mortgage Settlement.”).
19. See, e.g., Bank of America Corp., LEXIS 188892, at *185-86 (providing that “[i]t
shall be the responsibility of the Monitor to determine whether Servicer is in compliance
with the Servicing Standards and the Mandatory Relief Requirements”).
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performance. In operation, the Settlement
resembled the supervisory work I did as North
Carolina Commissioner of Banks. Given its
structure, the choice of a supervisor rather than a
prosecutor to act as Monitor is understandable.
•

Supervision by a Federal Judge. Unlike a
number of other settlements, the National
Mortgage Settlement was and is under the
continuing jurisdiction of a court, in this case,
the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia. The court reviewed and accepted
the filing of Settlement documents before
performance of its terms began in 2012, and has
exercised continuing jurisdiction ever since.
This
ongoing
court
supervision
has
accomplished a number of important goals for
the Settlement: (i) independent and continuing
judicial review and oversight of both its terms
and implementation; (ii) public access to the
reports I have filed as Monitor; and (iii) a venue
for the resolution of collateral claims and
disputes.

•

Limited Duration. Each consent judgment that
is part of the Settlement has a defined term that
ends with a “hard stop.” The servicing standards
of the original five judgments “sunset” as to
each of the servicer parties in October of 2015,
and my final report on their compliance was
filed with the court in March of 2016.20 Three
consent judgments remain in effect today, but
each of them also has a hard stop in 2017 or
2018. After sunset, each servicer remains

20. OFFICE OF MORTG. SETTLEMENT OVERSIGHT, ORIGINAL SERVICERS’ FINAL
COMPLIANCE UPDATE 13 (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/wpcontent/uploads/sites/4/2016/02/Original-Servicers-Final-Compliance-Update2.29.2016.pdf.
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subject to regulation by the CFPB and the States.
Although I did not participate in the negotiation of the
Settlement, I am—I hope pardonably—biased in its favor. It met a clear
public need by establishing binding rules on the handling of distressed
mortgage loans while the CFPB was being stood up and caused the
major banks to provide a substantial amount of badly needed debt relief
to distressed borrowers. Having done its work, it now ends.
IV. LESSONS FROM THE NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT
So, what lessons do I take away from my service as Monitor?
First, the regulation and supervision of consumer finance generally—
and home mortgage finance in particular—is an exercise in the
management of complexity. Servicing of consumer loans is a systemsdriven activity that is well suited to the handling of loans that are
current and performing and ill-suited to the handling loans that are not.
The legal requirements confronting financial services firms in handling
distressed loans, including state foreclosure laws, federal and state
consumer protection laws, and bankruptcy are complex and vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and court to court. Programming servicing
systems to deal with federal and state legal and regulatory requirements
is mind-numbingly complex, expensive, and prone to error.
Compliance is costly and non-compliance is risky and potentially
costlier. These risks and costs may lead to further or continued
concentration of the financial services industry and marginally
increased costs and reduced availability of credit to consumers.
The Settlement accommodated these difficulties by making
performance subject to rigorous rules measured by tests with reasonable
margins of error. Absent this fault-tolerant approach, two solutions to
the complexity problem, neither very satisfactory, suggest themselves:
(i) conformity of our legal and regulatory practices to the requirements
of large institutions’ systems; or (ii) admission that compliance with all
applicable law cannot be done by systems and must be done manually,
with the attendant increase in cost and loss of efficiency. Pick your
poison.
Second, time-limited and properly supervised interventions like
the Settlement can be a valuable augmentation of more permanent
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regulatory regimes. Such interventions can be tailored to a specific
problem and adapted to changing circumstances quickly and flexibly.
While they aren’t a cure-all, such interventions are useful tools that
have the added benefit of self-liquidation. There is potential for
focused, effective, and limited government here if governments and
regulated industries will use them.
Finally, the interests of all stakeholders to financial settlements
are best served by openness in terms of process and implementation. As
noted above, my reports to the court were public; further, with the help
of very skilled communications experts, I reported to the public in a
summary and relatively non-technical way. My operations were
conducted through a not-for-profit corporation whose financial
statements were audited and made public. While these features of the
NMS did not satisfy all of its critics, I think they went a long way to
establishing trust in its integrity.
I hope that these lessons are at least considered as the postDodd-Frank regulatory structure for consumer finance develops;
however, it is not clear that they will be. To date, the National
Mortgage Settlement is “one of a kind.”
V. FINAL THOUGHTS
Years after the Financial Crisis, there remains a significant
amount of distrust in government, the financial system, and in
settlements that bring the two together. It is highly unlikely that any
settlement can meet the popular desire for retribution. The cost/benefit
analysis from both government and financial services firms that lead to
settlements is cold, complex, and difficult to explain. This doesn’t
mean it’s wrong to settle; just that the settling parties have to rebut a
number of negative presumptions about their motives and perhaps their
competence.
I believe the National Mortgage Settlement supports the
proposition that fostering public trust and confidence in settlements is
best achieved by open processes and clear disclosure of results.
Whether the National Mortgage Settlement is emulated in the future or
not, I hope its lessons are not lost.

